


Executive Registry	
76-8804/3	
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI	
<p>This is the draft of the response that Zeke was preparing for the DCI. Keegan's memo is obviously part of his record building and the response is in part intended as a counter-record. H. Stoertz has seen the draft, has no problem with it, but points out that Keegan may use it in part as a lever to indicate he can use some months to conduct a thorough review of the CIA analysis. Stoertz suggests a meeting with you and the DCI on that point prior to sending the response. Could also decide then whether you or the DCI should sign a response.</p>	
	23 Aug. 76 (DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

25X1A

*attach to 76-8804/2 #
24 Aug
T-102*

T-10.2

USAF review(s) completed.

23 AUG 1976

*Dirks
for
DCI's sig.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General George J. Keegan, Jr.
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
SUBJECT : BACKFIRE

1. In your letter of 18 August, you proposed that CIA consider adding Mr. Bud E. Nelson of Boeing Aircraft Corp. and Mr. Daniel E. Pratt of General Dynamics Corporation as members on the CIA Panel to review the CIA 25X1A analysis of the BACKFIRE. Mr. Zellmer, the Associate Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence contacted your office on 20 August to accept the proposal and invitations to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Pratt were made that date. In addition to the above, the Panel consists of the following members:

Mr. Clarence L. Johnson, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

Mr. George S. Schairer, Boeing Aircraft Corp.

Mr. Ray V. Harris, Jr., NASA, Langley Research Center

Mr. Edwin H. Tompkins, Jr., Tompkins & Associates, Inc.

Mr. Harry N. Cotter, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Corp.

2. As you have been advised, we are in the process of completing our analysis and will make it available for Community review in the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee as soon as possible. However, because of the

importance of this study, I have instructed that the analysis must be thorough and that time pressures must not result in an inadequate consideration of this complex problem. To ensure that the Intelligence Community has had as much time as possible to consider the information being studied and the methodology being pursued, the CIA last April initiated a series of meetings with interested analysts including those from the Foreign Technology Division. At these meetings (April, May, June) the CIA [] reviewed the information being used and the status of their analysis.

3. Your letter commented that the CIA [] analyses were prematurely surfaced in the national arena before they were subjected to a thorough interagency review. There are times when it is essential to warn the policy-maker that a new analysis may change past perceptions.

Considering the status of the SALT II negotiations last May,

~~we~~ **A** believed that such an early warning was necessary. The VPWG was advised in June and the VP in July that a CIA

analysis, then not complete, indicated that the range of the BACKFIRE may be significantly less than earlier estimated. [

believe that failure to warn the VPWG and VP of a possible change in an estimate of this significance to the ongoing SALT-II negotiations would have been a dereliction of my responsibility.]

~~for straight to when I see any intelligence~~
significant developments that could change

intent on seeing to it

4. I am ~~very concerned~~ that the BACKFIRE analysis be done on a thorough and objective basis. It is essential that the Intelligence Community present such judgments in support of policy decisions relating to SALT II and other national security issues. I intend to ensure that this be accomplished with deliberate haste. [Your and the Intelligence Community support in this approach are essential to the accomplishment of this important goal.]


? / *but not at the expense of a thoroughness.*

Approved For Release 2005/01/21 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~DCI~~

8/24/76

H. Stoertz and I recommend signature on this memorandum which does not include "but not at the expense of thoroughness" at the end. The thoroughness point is made earlier and we are concerned that an additional stress on it would be what Gen. Keegan may be looking for -- an opportunity to review the analysis on into next year.


Ernest J. Zellmer

24 August 1976
(DATE)

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

25X1A

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET
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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH	
	COMMENT		FILE	
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

DATE _____

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

76-8804/2A

24 AUG 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General George J. Keegan, Jr.
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF

FROM : George Bush
Director

SUBJECT : BACKFIRE

1. In your letter of 18 August, you proposed that CIA consider adding Mr. Bud E. Nelson of The Boeing Company and Mr. Daniel E. Pratt of General Dynamics Corporation as members on the CIA Panel to review the CIA/[] analysis of the BACKFIRE. Mr. Zellmer, Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology, contacted your office on 20 August to accept the proposal and invitations to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Pratt were made that date. In addition to the above, the Panel consists of the following members:

25X1A

Mr. Clarence L. Johnson, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
Mr. George S. Schairer, The Boeing Company
Mr. Roy V. Harris, Jr., NASA, Langley Research Center
Mr. Edwin H. Tompkins, Jr., Tompkins & Associates, Inc.
Mr. Stanley H. Ellis, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Corp.

2. As you have been advised, we are in the process of completing our analysis and will make it available for Community review in the Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee as soon as possible. However, because of the importance of this study, I have instructed that the analysis must be thorough and that time pressures must not result in an inadequate consideration of this complex problem. To ensure that the Intelligence Community has had as much time as possible to consider the information being studied and the methodology being pursued, the CIA last April initiated a series of meetings with interested analysts including those from the Foreign Technology Division. At these meetings (April, May, June) the

T-10.2

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY



SECRET


SUBJECT: BACKFIRE

25X1A CIA and [] reviewed the information being used and the status of their analysis.

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25X1A

4. I am intent on seeing to it that the BACKFIRE analysis be done on a thorough and objective basis. I intend to insure that this be accomplished in a timely fashion.


George Bush

SECRET

SUBJECT: BACKFIRE

25X1A

CIA and [REDACTED] reviewed the information being used and the status of their analysis.

3. Your letter commented that the CIA/[REDACTED] analyses were prematurely surfaced in the national arena before they were subjected to a thorough interagency review. There are times when it is essential to warn the policy-maker that a new analysis may change past perceptions. Considering the status of the SALT II negotiations last May, we believed that such an early warning was necessary. The VPWG was advised in June and the VP in July that a CIA analysis, then not complete, indicated that the range of the BACKFIRE may be significantly less than earlier estimated.

25X1A

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George Bush

SUBJECT: BACKFIRE

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee
1 - IC Staff
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - D/OWI
1 - DSD/OWI
1 - ER
1 - DDS&T Registry
1 - ADDS&T

25X1A O/DDS&T:EJZellmer: 23Aug76

★	★	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET
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Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/IC		X		
4	DDS&T	X			
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI		X		
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

*2. In previous conversation
here is another cy, indicating
distribution*

20 August 1976

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4


TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: Ben Evans <i>Mr Zellmer</i>		<i>19 Aug</i>
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>Please forward the attached to Zeke Zellmer for a response.</p> <p><i>& provide appropriate additional information pls.</i></p>		
FROM: DCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 741
FEB 64

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED

(57)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79-008467 A002500080012-4
WASHINGTON, D.C.



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IN

SUBJECT: BACKFIRE (U)

18 AUG 1976

T-10.2

TO: Director of Central Intelligence (Mr. Bush)

1. (C) In the current controversy over performance assessments of the BACKFIRE bomber, CIA personnel have been quite cooperative in discussing their work with Air Force analysts. Your efforts to promote this dialogue between our respective analysts are appreciated very much. Hopefully, it will eventually lead to a resolution of our differences.

25X1A
2. (S) I understand that a draft of the report containing the CIA/ [redacted] analysis has still not been disseminated outside CIA. This is somewhat disturbing because essentially all that is known of the new analysis has been obtained through word-of-mouth. A written report is required before an efficient, meaningful, in-depth review can be performed by other agencies -- and such a review is essential if differences are to be addressed in detail. I had been led to believe that the CIA report would be available in early July, then early August, and now it appears that it will be several more weeks before it is available. I fear that this will not allow time for thorough scrutiny before key judgments are made in SALT and NIE 11-3/8-76. In this regard, the delay in the CIA report will undoubtedly hamper the WSSIC Air Weapon Systems Subcommittee's efforts to produce a BACKFIRE Report for use in preparation of NIE 11-3/8-76.

3. (S) I have been informed that CIA is planning to have their new analysis reviewed by a panel of external experts. This is an excellent idea. If I may propose a couple of panel members, I believe the following engineers would be valuable contributors to the CIA review:


Mr. Bud E. Nelson
Manager, Advanced Concepts
Military Airplane Development
The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington

Mr. Daniel E. Pratt
Project Manager, F-111 Improvements
General Dynamics Corporation
Fort Worth, Texas

Classified by: ACS/E H. USAF
SUBJECT TO GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON
31 DECEMBER 1984

4. (S) I regret that the results of the CIA/ [] analysis were prematurely surfaced in the national arena before they were subjected to a thorough interagency review. The ensuing focus of attention on differences between our analyses has made resolution of these differences more difficult. However, I am hopeful that the cooperative effort which you have fostered will eventually prove fruitful.

25X1A


GEORGE J. KEEGAN, JR.
Major General, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

SECRET

92. HV 15 01 02 907

FR

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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2	DDCI		X		
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4	DDS&T	X			
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI		X		
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
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22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

*2:10 per our conversation
 her is another cy, indicating
 distribution*

Executive Secretary
 20 August 1976

Date

3637 (7-76)

25X1A

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: Ben Evans <i>Mr Zellmer</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>Please forward the attached to Zeke Zellmer for a response.</p> <p><i>& provide appropriate additional distribution pks.</i></p>		
FROM: DCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	ROOM NO.

SECRET

T-10.2

176-8804/21

Approved For Release 2005/01/21 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IN

18 AUG 1976

SUBJECT: BACKFIRE (U)

TO: Director of Central Intelligence (Mr. Bush)

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General Dynamics Corporation
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Classified by: ACS/I H, USAF
SUBJECT TO GENERAL
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
Approved For Release 2005/01/21 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

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Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

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25X1A


GEORGE J. KEEGAN, JR.
Major General, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

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~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
76-8804/A

11 AUG 1976

Major General George J. Keegan, Jr.
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dear George:

We have your frank comments on the Soviet Backfire bomber analysis performed by this Agency and [redacted] We take exception to many of the points you have made, but are confident that our differences can be addressed at the special sessions of the Air Weapon Systems Subcommittee convened for that purpose.

25X1A

We continue to study and assess all aspects of the capabilities of the Backfire, and we will be sure to keep you and others fully informed as the work proceeds.

Faithfully yours,

[redacted]

25X1A

E. H. Knoche
Deputy Director

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI 1 - ER
1 - DDS&T
1 - D/DCI/NI
2 - EHKnoche files
EHK/FR/me:11Aug76

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FILE

T-10.2

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

Classified by	Signer
Exempt from general	
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652	
Automatically declassified on	
Date Impossible to Determine	



MEMORANDUM FOR: ADDS&T

76-8804/1

DDGI concurs in your judgment that OWI's ^{10/2/77} comments on General Keegan's Backfire rebuttal should not be sent to the General at this time. He wonders, however, if by remaining completely silent we might not create the wrong impression. Therefore, I have drafted this brief reply for him, with the assistance of [redacted]

Welcome your thoughts and comments.

Many thanks,

A2DDCT

Date 10/8/76

DRAFT PROPOSED LETTER TO GENERAL KEEGAN
(ACSI)

Secret
DDI
DDST
DDI/NI
10 August 1976
EHR

Dear General Keegan:

We appreciated your frank comments on the Soviet Backfire
bomber analysis performed by this Agency

25X1A

We take exception to many of the points you have made, but are
confident that our differences can be addressed at the special
sessions of the ~~Aircraft Working Group~~ *Air Weapon Systems Subcommittee* convened for that purpose.

We continue to believe that the revised characteristics
resulting from our analysis represent a true and consistent
picture of the capabilities of the Backfire.

FORM NO. 238 1 MAY 55		REPLACES FORM 35-1 WHICH IS OBSOLETE		DOCUMENT CONTROL (13-40) MFG 1-76	
ER/76 8804/1		SEC. CL. ORIGIN A/DDCI		CONTROL NO. DDS&T/ 3506/76/1	
DATE OF DOC 8/10/76	DATE REC'D 8/10/76	DATE OUT	SUSPENSE DATE	CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING	
TO Draft Proposed Letter to General Keegan				ROUTING	
FROM [REDACTED]				DATE SENT	
SUBJ. OWI's Comments on Gen Keegan's (Backfire) rebuttal should not be sent				EO/DDS&T	
REC- 1 Copy-ADDS&T					
1- REG					
COURIER NO.	ANSWERED	NO REPLY		6	

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4

DCI/DDCI

Routing Slip

7

TO:


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6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC		X*	18			
9	D/DCI/NIS		X	19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

* less attachments



DCI/DDCI
9 AUG 1976

25X1A

T-10.2

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Executive Registry



2 August 1976

Mr. George Bush
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Bush

I am most grateful to you for the time accorded me this morning on the BACKFIRE. Open diplomacy openly arrived at - at least within the confines of the intelligence structure - is obviously the best way to proceed. Needless to say, we in the Air Force are looking forward to the inter-agency examination of the new analysis on BACKFIRE.

Preliminary to further discussion of the estimative problem within the US Intelligence Community, you may wish to read the attached study by Dr. Al Wohlstetter regarding the estimative record of the past decade.


Dr. Wohlstetter prepared his post-mortem utilizing the Secretary of Defense's annual posture statements to the Congress - over a span of 8-10 years. His work demonstrates clearly that - in the strategic area at least - the Community has consistently and by a rather wide margin underestimated both the size and the rate of Soviet force deployments. He demonstrates further that even the "high side" of the threat estimates tend to underestimate what will be deployed.

Attached also is a CIA evaluation of Dr. Wohlstetter's work - concurring. Bill Colby also confirmed to General Jones, the CIA staff, and me - at a CIA luncheon - that Wohlstetter, regrettably, was right.

Unfortunately, Dr. Wohlstetter merely scratches the surface of the problem. In my opinion, it would be a most useful undertaking to have an outside agency audit the entire performance record of the NIEs since they were first issued in the early 1950 era. Armed with such an analysis, we might then better understand what our difficulties have been, what the estimative predilections of the Community tend to be, and how we might restructure ourselves to avoid some of the more difficult problems of the past.

Again, thanks for the time you accorded me, and you may rest assured that I will leave no stone unturned to support an objective interagency assessment of the BACKFIRE.

Warmest personal regards


GEORGE D. KEEGAN, JR.
Major General, USAF
ACS/Intelligence

2 Atchs

1. "Legends of the Strategic Arms Race(U)
2. CIA Evaluation, #188 (S/NF)



SECRET